Tuesday, 15 December 2015

Demands on viewpoint and arguments – or cultural and human wretchedness.

The remarkable accept of random viewpoints.

Apparently, it is a widespread view that just having a standpoint has a value in itself. Some politicians and other people even think that without any further ado their political attitude can make up a sufficient counterargument in a discussion, maybe even an argument that can overthrow scientific arguments.
Some persons put forward statements such as “I respect her for insisting on her viewpoints”. However, there is only something worthy of respect if the speaker can advance sufficient arguments, as the next easy thing in the world is just having a viewpoint. For it demands no special reflection to choose an arbitrary point of view one just happens to like. Many people have irrational viewpoints. There is nothing of value in this. Some people are sincerely praised for their courage to stand up for their position. However, the easiest thing is to maintain a position. For this demands nothing at all, only the termination of self-criticism.[1]
What is demanded is the ability to argue for ones viewpoints. Having arguments is the preposition for possessing a standpoint. The less one reflects the easier it is to have a position.
It must be observed that substantiating one’s viewpoints with something else one just has chosen to think cannot make up any argumentation unless this is already well founded. Having a serious viewpoint naturally demands an illuminated and valuable argumentation.
Thus, the case is the opposite of how many people understand it: The more one think about it, the more difficult it is to have a standpoint. To summarize:
The next easiest thing in the world is to have a standpoint, for that just consists in choosing a standpoint that just suits oneself and to put a few words on it.
The very easiest thing in the world is to “stand firm on one’s viewpoint” for that demands nothing at all.
Statements such as “I have my opinion, and you have yours” and “My views can be just as good as yours”, which really is heard now and then, do not lead the society forwards. On the contrary, it leads to a situation where the parts stand in each corner and cannot do anything else than putting forward such statements. Only the sword remains.[2]
One of the silliest thing some may say in a discussion at all, but which nevertheless is frequently heard, is “You must put up with the fact that some people thinks something different than you do”.
For this criticism presupposes the just refuted idea that the mere having an opinion about something is positive and respectable. I addition, it is a defeat and an insult of the person that contrary to the speaker does the only right thing that must be done in a debate, namely simply to argue.

Demands to argumentation.

Any valuable argumentation has as its most fundamental demand that one can explain the meaning of the used expressions. This is especially a problem to religious persons, for when they assert “I believe in God” they put forward a sentence that contains two expressions that have no semantic meanings.
It is naturally not a problem that the religious us expressions such as “to believe” in the sense to suppose or to trust or that they use the term “god” as a term for a character in a fiction. However, it is typically not in this way that the religious persons use these expressions.
Thus, if some religious person asks, “What is your relation to god?” one must ask him what the expression “god” denotes. However, they cannot explain this in any valid wat, e.g. per genus et differentiam.[3]
Such an explanation is made up by e.g. the definition “A chair is a piece of furniture to sit on”. Here “chair” is genus, the hypernym, or the wider term, which is further explained. This is done by the differentiam, which is here the difference from the concept “chair”, namely the supplementary description “to sit on”. The genus referred to naturally must have a telling content, for otherwise it is empty. Therefore, expressions such as something” or “being”, which just means something existing (i.e. that what has to be defined exists), cannot be used here.
Typically, the religious persons reuse these words without using them in these senses or in any specified sense at all, but only as expressions to which they attach some vague ideas. These empty sign sequences just borrow an appearance of semantic meaning from the original and factual words, such as “belief” and “salvation”.
If, quite counterfactually, the religious persons could present an explanation of this kind, they would hardly be content with the natural and easily understandable explanation that hereby would arise.
Ironically enough, the only semantically meaningful thing we can assert that the religious people believe in, and which concern religion, is that they believe that the religious sentence has semantic meaning.

Consequences of the acceptance of meaningless expressions.

If one accepts the use of semantically meaningless expressions in one’s own and congenial persons’ sentences, one accept the idea that everything can be asserted and put forward without good justifications and explanations, i.e. also appraisal of all sorts of misery too. For by this one’s critical sense is invalidated.
However, what is it actually that is put forward if it is semantically senseless? At best, only diffuse statements. Those who advance them do that based on some diffuse ideas that consist in distortion of clear ideas. What is worse is that those who accept them may think they can draw conclusions based on such pseudo statements, and here we can be dealing with everything. Thus those who advance such statements may also feel justified in asserting whatever and carry out atrocities.
Some would object that among these statements, there can also be recommendations to do this or that that is for the benefit for people or humanity. However, these sentences are arbitrary, and thus we do not know in advance which kind of statements we have to do with. Thus, it is unlikely that we are dealing with pure reason without intermixed non-sense. In any circumstances, they have to be justified.
Such a state is of course completely unacceptable, as it threat the peace locally and globally.
It has been concluded that is the basis of any religion that it is assumed to be acceptable to advance and accept semantically senseless sentences or sequences of signs. This means that when one accept the most innocent Christianity or any other religion, one accept not just the basis of this religion, but also the basis of all possible insanity religions: the acceptance of semantically meaningless sequence of signs, for this is common to them all. These religions proliferate themselves like Hydra’s heads and they can therefore not be fought down by war.
Only enlightenment and reason can get this disorder to wither away

The mandatory ethics of the religions.

It must be observed that religious ethical statements certainly can have semantic meaning; however, they are just borrowed feathers of the religions. For ethical statements must be justified on the basis of an understanding of the case itself. Referring to commands is pitiable and thoughtless. Moreover, like anything else, ethical commands cannot be concluded from semantically senseless sentences.
These ethical statements just work as a sort of promotion for the rest of the religion. It must likewise be observed that this accept creeps in anywhere:
If an organisation with a name that refers to Christian makeshift announces for its makeshift, this organisation promotes for religion by connecting its name with the idea of the good thing it does: makeshift. With the one hand, i.e. by its name, this organisation supports the common basis of the religions, which is also the basis of the religions that creates the misery it with the other hand collects money for mitigating.
In a similar way, a union with name The Crusaders of Christianity will connect itself with good acts qua the choice of its name. This means that if a person lets himself be photographed together with a happy crowd of handicapped in the Crusaders’ rooms, then this person also promotes the religion and its basis.

The cultural and human catastrophe.

The faulty idea that it is legitimate and sensible to put forward sentences that does not need to have semantic sense is an erroneous and unlucky assumption. It is a cultural and human catastrophe, mildly put. With this idea, a catastrophically great progress takes place from sense to the deepest lack of sense.
This idea of acting on the basis of statements that lack the most basic thing in being sense, namely semantic meaning, clears the way for all sorts of wretched statements and acts that can be  promoted by all conceivable felonious rulers.
This idea flouts argumentations and therefore one can get the thought that those who chose to be religious are not interested in the demand that their expressions must be words. For this choice, give them a false alibi for being able to assert and do whatever.
However, those who can think and argue clearly and realize the above conclusions ought to seek to hinder this wretchedness – by means of a wisdom and mediation, which then hopefully will spread like wildfire.

Litteratur:

[Hegel 88]         G.W.F. Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes
Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH (Hamburg 1988).
”Indem jener sich auf das Gefühl, sein inwendiges Orakel, beruft, ist er gegen den, der nicht übereinstimmt, fertig; er muß erklaren, daß er dem weiter nichts zu sagen habe, der nicht dasselbe in sich finde und fühle; - mit andern Worten, er tritt die Wurzel der Humanität mit Füßen. Denn die Natur dieser ist, auf die Übereinkunft mit andern zu dringen, und ihre Existenz nur in der zu Stande gebrachten Gemeinsamkeit der Bewußtsein. Das Widermenschliche, das Tierische besteht darin, im Gefühle stehen zu bleiben und nur durch dieses sich mitteilen zu können.”



[1] In a previous contribution, I have written that “nothing is more easy than just to have a standpoint”.
[2] According to G.W.F. Hegel it is anti-humanistic only to express ones feelings and not wanting to explain oneself to those who does not to oneself. Hegel expresses this in ”Vorrede” to Phänomenologie agree des Geistes in which he talk about what he calls “common sense” and puts forward that:
When a person just invoke his feeling, his inner oracle, he is through with the person who does not agree with him. Hr can the only state that he does not have further to say the person that does not feel or find the same thing in himself.  The person in question thus tramples the rood of humanity under foot. For it is the nature of what is human to reach an agreement wither other persons and this only exists in an obtained fellowship of understanding. The inhuman the animal attitude consist in remaining standing at the feeling and only express onseslf through this.  (G.W.F. Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes, Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 1988, p. 51, my abbreviated version.)
This can be justified by the fact that without communication we become isolated beings. Lacking interest in explaining oneself is also lacking interest in clarifying ones own viewpoints, in thinking them through one time more. History, also has documented that such an attitude is dangerous to peace in the world, namely if one wants to spread ones viewpoints without arguing.
[3] This is thoroughly discussed in the section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise No 5, at

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